The New York Times bestselling author of Predictably Irrational and The Upside of Irrationality returns with thought-provoking work to challenge our preconceptions about dishonesty and urge us to take an honest look at ourselves. Does the chance of getting caught affect how likely we are to cheat? How do companies pave the way for dishonesty? Does collaboration make us more honest or less so? Does religion improve our honesty? Most of us think of ourselves as honest, but, in fact, we all cheat. From Washington to Wall Street, the classroom to the workplace, unethical behavior is everywhere. None of us is immune, whether it's the white lie to head off trouble or padding our expense reports. In The (Honest) Truth About Dishonesty, award-winning, bestselling author Dan Ariely turns his unique insight and innovative research to the question of dishonesty. Generally, we assume that cheating, like most other decisions, is based on a rational cost-benefit analysis. But Ariely argues, and then demonstrates, that it's actually the irrational forces that we don't take into account that often determine whether we behave ethically or not. For every Enron or political bribe, there are countless puffed rÉsumÉs, hidden commissions, and knockoff purses. In The (Honest) Truth About Dishonesty, Ariely shows why some things are easier to lie about; how getting caught matters less than we think; and how business practices pave the way for unethical behavior, both intentionally and unintentionally. Ariely explores how unethical behavior works in the personal, professional, and political worlds, and how it affects all of us, even as we think of ourselves as having high moral standards. But all is not lost. Ariely also identifies what keeps us honest, pointing the way for achieving higher ethics in our everyday lives. With compelling personal and academic findings, The (Honest) Truth About Dishonesty will change the way we see ourselves, our actions, and others.

Every day, we make decisions on topics ranging from personal investments to schools for our children to the meals we eat to the causes we champion. Unfortunately, we often choose poorly. The reason, the authors explain, is that, being human, we all are susceptible to various biases that can lead us to blunder. Our mistakes make us poorer and less healthy; we often make bad decisions involving education, personal finance, health care, mortgages and credit cards, the family, and even the planet itself. Thaler and Sunstein invite us to enter an alternative world, one that takes our humanness as a given. They show that by knowing how people think, we can design choice environments that make it easier for people to choose what is best for themselves, their families, and their society. Using colorful examples from the most important aspects of life, Thaler and Sunstein demonstrate how thoughtful choice architecture” can be established to nudge us in beneficial directions without restricting freedom of choice. Nudge offers a unique new takefrom neither the left nor the righton many hot-button issues, for individuals and governments alike. This is one of the most engaging and provocative books to come along in many years. (20080518)

《兜售繁荣》主要内容包括：每逢经济危机，寻找“复苏”和“繁荣”的良方，便成为那些“事后诸葛亮”的预言家欺世盗名的立身之本，而一些政府也经常病急乱投医，总是听信那些政策企业家兜售的“繁荣”政策，试图借此走出经济低谷。然而，当“政策企业家”取代了真正的经济学教授，当庸俗的经济学偏方击败了严肃的经济学思想，当坏的经济学理论驱逐了好的经济学理论，一国的经济增长和发展又会受到怎样的伤害？对真正的经济学家来说，是该坚守还是放弃严密的政策思考和谨慎的理沦研究？在这个被失望情绪笼罩的年代，谁才拥有真正的繁荣点金之手？ 在这本言辞犀利、视角敏锐的佳作中，经济学大师克鲁格曼以七十年代后的美国为样本，精辟分析了经济观点影响政策决策的过程，深刻揭露了其间所发生的种种怪象。对于当前一心追求繁荣的各国政府、致力于提供政策建议的学者乃至众多迷惑不解的公众而言，《兜售繁荣》的观点无异于醍醐灌顶。诚如书中所言，严肃的经济学家的思想不仅更能引导我们发现真相，而且会更有趣味。

The first authoritative history of hedge funds-from their rebel beginnings to their role in defining the future of finance. Based on author Sebastian Mallaby's unprecedented access to the industry, including three hundred hours of interviews, More Money Than God tells the inside story of hedge funds, from their origins in the 1960s and 1970s to their role in the financial crisis of 2007- 2009. Wealthy, powerful, and potentially dangerous, hedge fund moguls have become the It Boys of twenty-firstcentury capitalism. Ken Griffin of Citadel started out trading convertible bonds from his dorm room at Harvard. Julian Robertson staffed his hedge fund with college athletes half his age, then he flew them to various retreats in the Rockies and raced them up the mountains. Paul Tudor Jones posed for a magazine photograph next to a killer shark and happily declared that a 1929- style crash would be "total rock-and-roll" for him. Michael Steinhardt was capable of reducing underlings to sobs. "All I want to do is kill myself," one said. "Can I watch?" Steinhardt responded. Finance professors have long argued that beating the market is impossible, and yet drawing on insights from physics, economics, and psychology, these titans have cracked the market's mysteries and gone on to earn fortunes. Their innovation has transformed the world, spawning new markets in exotic financial instruments and rewriting the rules of capitalism. More than just a history, More Money Than God is a window on tomorrow's financial system. Hedge funds have been left for dead after past financial panics: After the stock market rout of the early 1970s, after the bond market bloodbath of 1994, after the collapse of Long Term Capital Management in 1998, and yet again after the dot-com crash in 2000. Each time, hedge funds have proved to be survivors, and it would be wrong to bet against them now. Banks such as CitiGroup, brokers such as Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers, home lenders such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, insurers such as AIG, and money market funds run by giants such as Fidelity-all have failed or been bailed out. But the hedge fund industry has survived the test of 2008 far better than its rivals. The future of finance lies in the history of hedge funds.

This is a landmark book on the impact of property rights on European economic development. Published over a quarter of a century ago, its stated goal is "... to suggest new paths for the study of European economic history rather than ... either [a detailed and exhaustive study or a precise empirical test that are the] ... standard formats" (p. vii). North and Thomas attempt to identify the elements that allowed the Western European economy to rise to affluence. Their argument is made transparent in Chapter One (Theory and Overview): the key to growth was and is an efficient economic system. Efficient in the sense that the system of property rights gives individuals incentives to innovate and produce, and, conversely inhibits those activities (rent-seeking, theft, arbitrary confiscation and/or excessive taxation) that reduce individual incentives. They argue that property rights are classic public goods because: (1) once a more efficient set of property rights is discovered the marginal cost of copying it is low (compared to the cost of discovering and developing it); (2) it is prohibitively expensive to prevent other political jurisdictions from emulating a more efficient set of property rights regardless of whether they contributed to their construction; (3) and finally, the idea of a set of property rights, like all ideas, is non-rival -- we can all consume the same idea and the "stock" of the idea is not diminished. These public good aspects lead them to conclude that there may be under investment in the attempts to create more efficient sets of property rights because the jurisdiction that invests in the development of property rights pays the entire cost of their development but receives only benefits that accrue to its jurisdiction, while other jurisdictions can get the benefits without any of the developmental costs. Thus, the problems of public goods and the "free riders."

这是一本: 对世界经济及商业最富洞察力和预见性的巨作！ 被比尔·盖茨、等全球商业领袖顶礼膜拜的里程碑作品 唯一一位3次获得普利策奖的财经作家 连续64周销量位居亚马逊书店十大畅销书之列 全球销售近1000万册 诺贝尔经济学奖得主斯蒂格利茨推荐 IBM大中华区总裁兼首席执行官周伟焜强烈推荐 IBM全体员工人手一册 《金融时报》与高盛2005年度最佳商业图书 When scholars write the history of the world twenty years from now, and they come to the chapter Y2K to March 2004, what will they say was the most crucial development? The attacks on the World Trade Center on 9/11 and the Iraq war? Or the convergence of technology and events that allowed India, China, and so many other countries to become part of the global supply chain for services and manufacturing, creating an explosion of wealth in the middle classes of the world's two biggest nations, giving them a huge new stake in the success of globalization? And with this flattening of the globe, which requires us to run faster in order to stay in place, has the world gotten too small and too fast for human beings and their political systems to adjust in a stable manner? In this brilliant new book, the award-winning New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman demystifies the brave new world for readers, allowing them to make sense of the often bewildering global scene unfolding before their eyes. With his inimitable ability to translate complex foreign policy and economic issues, Friedman explains how the flattening of the world happened at the dawn of the twenty-first century; what it means to countries, companies, communities, and individuals; and how governments and societies can, and must, adapt. The World Is Flat is the timely and essential update on globalization, its successes and discontents, powerfully illuminated by one of our most respected journalists. : Thomas L. Friedman is not so much a futurist, which he is sometimes called, as a presentist. His aim in The World Is Flat, as in his earlier, influential Lexus and the Olive Tree, is not to give you a speculative preview of the wonders that are sure to come in your lifetime, but rather to get you caught up on the wonders that are already here. The world isn't going to be flat, it is flat, which gives Friedman's breathless narrative much of its urgency, and which also saves it from the Epcot-style polyester sheen that futurists--the optimistic ones at least--are inevitably prey to. What Friedman means by "flat" is "connected": the lowering of trade and political barriers and the exponential technical advances of the digital revolution that have made it possible to do business, or almost anything else, instantaneously with billions of other people across the planet. This in itself should not be news to anyone. But the news that Friedman has to deliver is that just when we stopped paying attention to these developments--when the dot-com bust turned interest away from the business and technology pages and when 9/11 and the Iraq War turned all eyes toward the Middle East--is when they actually began to accelerate. Globalization 3.0, as he calls it, is driven not by major corporations or giant trade organizations like the World Bank, but by individuals: desktop freelancers and innovative startups all over the world (but especially in India and China) who can compete--and win--not just for low-wage manufacturing and information labor but, increasingly, for the highest-end research and design work as well. (He doesn't forget the "mutant supply chains" like Al-Qaeda that let the small act big in more destructive ways.) Friedman has embraced this flat world in his own work, continuing to report on his story after his book's release and releasing an unprecedented hardcover update of the book a year later with 100 pages of revised and expanded material. What's changed in a year? Some of the sections that opened eyes in the first edition--on China and India, for example, and the global supply chain--are largely unaltered. Instead, Friedman has more to say about what he now calls "uploading," the direct-from-the-bottom creation of culture, knowledge, and innovation through blogging, podcasts, and open-source software. And in response to the pleas of many of his readers about how to survive the new flat world, he makes specific recommendations about the technical and creative training he thinks will be required to compete in the "New Middle" class. As before, Friedman tells his story with the catchy slogans and globe-hopping anecdotes that readers of his earlier books and his New York Times columns know well, and he holds to a stern sort of optimism. He wants to tell you how exciting this new world is, but he also wants you to know you're going to be trampled if you don't keep up with it. A year later, one can sense his rising impatience that our popular culture, and our political leaders, are not helping us keep pace. 　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　--Tom Nissley Before 9/11, New York Times columnist Friedman was best known as the author of The Lexus and the Olive Tree, one of the major popular accounts of globalization and its discontents. Having devoted most of the last four years of his column to the latter as embodied by the Middle East, Friedman picks up where he left off, saving al-Qaeda et al. for the close. For Friedman, cheap, ubiquitous telecommunications have finally obliterated all impediments to international competition, and the dawning "flat world" is a jungle pitting "lions" and "gazelles," where "economic stability is not going to be a feature" and "the weak will fall farther behind." Rugged, adaptable entrepreneurs, by contrast, will be empowered. The service sector (telemarketing, accounting, computer programming, engineering and scientific research, etc.), will be further outsourced to the English-spoken abroad; manufacturing, meanwhile, will continue to be off-shored to China. As anyone who reads his column knows, Friedman agrees with the transnational business executives who are his main sources that these developments are desirable and unstoppable, and that American workers should be preparing to "create value through leadership" and "sell personality." This is all familiar stuff by now, but the last 100 pages on the economic and political roots of global Islamism are filled with the kind of close reporting and intimate yet accessible analysis that have been hard to come by. Add in Friedman's winning first-person interjections and masterful use of strategic wonksterisms, and this book should end up on the front seats of quite a few Lexuses and SUVs of all stripes. Although it may be catchy, the title of New York Times columnist Friedman's latest book needs explaining. "Flat" here means "level," as in the level playing field on which virtually any nation can now compete, thanks to the explosion of global telecommunications, including the Internet as well as the transfer of information from First World to Third--and back. There's also a leveling of hierarchies within organizations, thanks to the increasing democratization of information from sources such as the Web. Friedman cites 10 forces that have caused this "flattening," including the fall of the Berlin Wall ("We could not think globally about the world when the Berlin Wall was there," said one economist), the emergence of Netscape as an Internet platform, workflow software, open sourcing, outsourcing, the streamlining of the supply chain (witness Wal-Mart), the organization of information on the Internet (Google, Yahoo), and the ubiquity of powerful personal telecommunications devices. Friedman is very thorough at projecting the consequences of these changes, noting the benefits we all share from this hyper-globalization, while realistically addressing, for example, the challenges American workers will face in the coming decades from talented, highly motivated workforces in such countries as India and China. A little more humor might have offset the author's trademark earnestness; still, as he has with other global issues, Friedman brings coherence and a workable plan of action to the fundamental changes our world is experiencing. 　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Alan Moores Adult/High School–This brilliantly paced, articulate, and accessible explanation of today's world is an ideal title for tech-savvy teens. Friedman's thesis is that connectedness by computer is leveling the playing field, giving individuals the ability to collaborate and compete in real time on a global scale. While the author is optimistic about the future, seeing progress in every field from architecture to zoology, he is aware that terrorists are also using computers to attack the very trends that make progress plausible and reasonable. This is a smart and essential read for those who will be expected to live and work in this new global environment 　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　–Alan Gropman, National Defense University, Washington, DC Distance has been annihilated. Your X rays are sent to India, your job to China. In a flat world the U.S. must seize every technological advantage and put the "oomph" we gave the moon shot into breaking our oil habit. (Although the writer suspects that he will be sent to the moon before "W." gets the message.) Narrator Oliver Wyman does a superb job. First he's the irrepressible American, then the Indian gentleman, and finally the Chinese whose English is formal but broken. The audiobook technology that enables us to take in so much information while caught in traffic or scrubbing a pan is precisely the sort of handhold Friedman would urge us all to grasp, and with both hands. B.H.C. Winner of AudioFile Earphones Award Friedman, nominally a liberal, has historically taken the middle path and supported laissez-faire capitalism, globalization, and the power of institutions like the International Monetary Fund. Ever optimistic about globalization, he pleases its proponents and disappoints its detractors in The World Is Flat. There’s no doubt that Friedman asks timely questions, even if he sometimes shirks definitive answers. Although he acknowledges terrorism’s global weight, he identifies an even more potent force shaping global economics and politics: the "triple convergence—of new players, on a new playing field, developing new processes … for horizontal collaboration," particularly in China and India. Friedman’s story comes alive as we meet the movers and shakers of Globalization 3.0, eavesdrop on Friedman’s interviews, and witness collaborations in progress. Friedman’s personal journey, if slightly padded, makes for entertaining and accessible reading. Yet critics, even those who support globalization, differed on Friedman’s thesis; India, for example, has not yet become the global superpower he describes; many scholars still describe the "flat world" as a nicer name for "cheap labor." Friedman also less effectively analyzes the effects of Globalization 3.0 than its players, and embraces technological determinism at the expense of thoroughly considering major political factors (like terrorist networks, which he’s previously compared to World War III). No matter your stance on the benefits or pitfalls of globalization, The World Is Flat is an important, thought-provoking book—even if Friedman’s answer to unresolved issues is, "Sort that out." Thomas L. Friedman has won the Pulitzer Prize three times for his work at The New York Times. He is the author of three best-selling books: From Beiruit to Jerusalem (FSG, 1989), winner of the National Book Award for nonfiction and still considered to be the definitive work on the Middle East, The Lexus and the Olive Tree: Understanding Globalization (FSG, 1999), and Longitudes and Attitudes: Exploring the World After September 11 (FSG, 2002). He lives in Bethesda, Maryland, with his family. 《世界是平的》中文版 精装版 《世界是平的》中文版 《世界是平的》中文版 平装版